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This article deals with the issue of entry into an industry where firms share a collective 
reputation. First, we show that free entry is not socially optimal; there is a need for 
regulation through the imposition of a minimum quality standard. Second, we argue that 
a minimum quality standard can induce firms to enter the market. Contrary to 
conventional wisdom, a minimum quality standard should not always be considered as a 
barrier to entry. 
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E-mail: soubeyra@supagro.inra.fr When food operators sell generic products, consumers partly base their
choices on the reputation of the entire industry. For instance, following an
outbreak of food poisoning, everyone along the contaminated item’s sup-
ply chain may suffer the consequences of a decrease in demand. The prob-
lem arises when consumers do not link the contamination to a particular
producer but to a generic product. After the Fall 2006 spinach outbreak,
the Economic Research Service of the United States Department of Agri-
culture reported that all US spinach growers suffered a drop in demand for
their product even though only one grower’s spinach was contaminated.
Five months later, the value of retail sales was still down 27% compared to
the same period in 2005 (Calvin 2007). In another example from 1997, more
than 200 people contracted hepatitis A after eating frozen strawberries. The
USDA reported that concerns over the safety of strawberries affected de-
mand for all berries. Experts estimated that the US berries industry bore
losses of between $15 million and $40 million dollars due to the outbreak
(Calvin, Avendaño and Schwentesius 2004). In 2003, following the discov-
ery of the ﬁrst cow infected by Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in the
USA, more than 30 countries banned US beef, threatening the 2.6 billion
dollars export market. Using UPC scanner data, Schlenker and Villas-Boas
(2007) show evidence of a drop in domestic beef sales as well.
The literature points out that a collective reputation is at stake in food in-
dustries in which food operators sell speciality or regional products (Win-
freeandMcCluskey2005). Thisisparticularlytruewhenconsumerscannot
identify the producer of a food product and/or food items are not trace-
able. Collective reputation has two main characteristics. First, producers
are hostage to each others’ behavior. Namely, an entire group of ﬁrms can
lose consumer trust as a result of one ﬁrm’s lack of diligence. Second, col-
lective reputation induces price premiums on the market. There are many
empirical evidence which show that a positive collective reputation is a
good tool to signal quality and is correlated with price premiums (Qua-
grainie, Mc Cluskey and Loureiro 2003). Price premiums work as incen-
tives for food operators to join the group.
There is little formal discussion in the literature about collective reputation.
Tirole (1996) considers that collective reputation should be assumed to be
the aggregate reputation of individual agents. In a context of imperfect
information available to consumers about quality, he shows that the com-
position of the producer group matters. Winfree and Mc Cluskey (2005)
assume that collective reputation is a common property resource and show
that the number of ﬁrms should be considered closely because of free-rider
effects. However, neither study allows for entry in or exit from the group
2of producers whose size is taken as ﬁxed.
The current article addresses the issue of free-entry when food operators
share a collective reputation (the industry reputation) in a context of imper-
fect information about product quality available to consumers. We show
thatfreeentryisnotsociallyoptimalduetotheproducers’incentivetofree-
ride on the collective reputation. This statement supports the introduction
of a minimum quality standard (MQS) to correct this market failure. In the
industrial organization literature, there is a controversial debate regarding
the effect of a MQS on competition (see Ronnen (1991), Crampes and Hol-
lander (1995), Ecchia and Lambertini (1997), Valetti (2000) for competition
effects of a MQS under perfect information for consumers about quality;
see Leland (1979), Garella and Petrakis (2006) for competition effects of a
MQS under imperfect information). In contrast to existing literature on the
negative competition effects of a MQS, we show that in a context of imper-
fect information for consumers about quality, the introduction of a MQS
can induce ﬁrms to enter the market.
The article proceeds as follows. In the light of empirical evidence, we set up
the theoretical model emphasizing the free entry issue. Next, we analyze
the competition effects when a MQS is imposed on the industry. Finally,
we provide our conclusions and their policy implications.
Oligopoly with collective reputation
We consider an industry in which identical and risk neutral food operators
sell generic products. In this case, if a quality failure occurs the collective
reputation at stake is the reputation of the entire industry. We consider a
two-stage game: in the ﬁrst stage, proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms choose whether
or not to enter the market. When a ﬁrm enters the market, it faces a ﬁxed
(sunk) cost F > 0. In the second stage, the ﬁrm makes a quality decision in
order to avoid quality failure, thereby contributing to the collective reputa-
tion of the industry. Once they have entered the market and paid the sunk
cost F, ﬁrms face a cost C (:) of providing quality with C0 > 0 and C00 > 0.
Mankiw and Whinston (1986) analyze a situation in which ﬁrms produce
an homogeneous product and the output per ﬁrm (strictly) decreases with
the number of ﬁrms. Since we focus on the role of collective reputation, in
our setting each ﬁrm produces one unit of the product.
Consumers only are able to imperfectly observe the average quality qa of
the product marketed. We thus assume that the reputation of the industry
is "good" with a probability R(qa), with R0 > 0 and R00 ￿ 0. The inverse
3demand function is then P (n) (with P0 < 0). The industry reputation is
"bad" with probability 1 ￿ R(qa) and consequently demand drops to 0.
Therefore, the expected proﬁt of a generic ﬁrm i is ￿i = R(qa)P (n) ￿
C (qi) ￿ F. We solve the game through backward induction. In the next
section, we ﬁrst present two reasonable assumptions from the monopolistic
case. We then examine the oligopoly situation.
Monopolist Processor
We start our analysis by considering the case where there is only one ﬁrm in
the market. In the second stage, the monopolistic ﬁrm makes a quality de-
cision q in order to maximize its proﬁt; Max
q R(q)PM ￿C (q); where PM =
P (1). The corresponding ﬁrst order condition is as follows R0 (qM)PM =
C0 (qM). In the ﬁrst stage, the monopoly payoff is given by ￿(qM;1) =
R(qM)PM ￿ C (qM) ￿ F. Let consider the two following assumptions:




Assumption 1 states that a ﬁrm always enters the market when it foresees
that no other ﬁrm would do so. According to assumption 2, a monopo-
listic ﬁrm cannot make any proﬁt when its investment in quality reaches
a certain level. All through the article, we assume that Assumption 1 and
Assumption 2 hold. We now analyze the situation where more than one
ﬁrm enter the market.
Oligopolist Processor
Proceeding with our analysis, we consider that n identical ﬁrms enter the
market. These ﬁrms produce a homogeneous good and share a collective
reputation. According to the latter statement, the entire industry can fail if
one ﬁrm misbehaves (Winfree and Mc Cluskey 2005; Carriquiry and Bab-
cock, 2007). First, we consider that ﬁrms make their quality decision, taking
the decisions of the others as given. Second, we examine the welfare effects
of competition.
Collective Reputation and Quality
In the second-stage, ﬁrms individually make their quality decision, qi, in
order to prevent a drop in demand. The second-stage problem for a ﬁrm
4i is then Max
qi





n . The ﬁrst order con-
dition is 1
nR0 (qa)P (n) = C0 (qi). It deﬁnes ﬁrm i0s best response as an
implicit function of the average quality level qa and the number of ﬁrms
n. Hence, each ﬁrm has an incentive to decrease its quality if the average
quality increases.
In an interior equilibrium, the ﬁrms’ quality decisions are all the same, i.e.




R0 (q￿)P (n) = C0 (q￿);
q￿ represents the non cooperative equilibrium quality level.

















C00 (q￿) ￿ 1
nR00 (q￿)P (n)
;
Thisexpressionhasanegativevalue. Indeed, P0 < 0, then
￿ 1




0: Moreover, R0 (q￿) > 0 and C00 (q￿) ￿ 1
nR00 (q￿)P (n) > 0.
We distinguish two effects. On the one hand, when the number of ﬁrms
in the market increases, the ﬁrms’ incentive to provide quality decreases.
This effect is identical to the ﬁndings of Winfree and Mc Cluskey (2005).
On the other hand, competition strengthens and the price of the product
consequently decreases. A ﬁrm’s beneﬁts are thus diluted and each ﬁrm
provides a lower level of quality.
In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrms decide to enter the market if their ex-ante expected
proﬁt is positive. The number of ﬁrms who enter the market is then char-
acterized by:
(3) R(q￿ (n￿))P (n￿) ￿ C (q￿ (n￿)) = F;
Where n￿ denotes the equilibrium number of ﬁrms, which is an implicit




[R0 (q￿)P (n￿) ￿ C0 (q￿)]
@q￿
@n + R(q￿)P0 (n￿)
i￿1
.
By deﬁnition, P0 < 0. From condition (1), R0 (q￿)P (n￿) ￿ C0 (q￿) ￿ 0 and
5according to Proposition 1,
@q￿
@n < 0. Then, @n￿
@F < 0. Consequently, the size
of the industry decreases as the entry cost increases.
With these results in hand, we turn to the welfare effect of competition.
The ambiguous welfare effect
In order to appraise the welfare effect of a change in the number of ﬁrms,
we consider the ﬁrst stage equilibrium.
If n ﬁrms enter the market, they anticipate that they will implement the
non cooperative equilibrium quality level q￿ in the second stage. Under
the assumption of quasi-linear consumer utility, the consumer’s surplus is
CS (q￿;n) = R(q￿)
￿n R
0
P (s)ds ￿ P (n)n
￿
. The total ex-ante proﬁt of the
industry is n￿(q￿;n) = n[R(q￿)P (n) ￿ C (q￿) ￿ F] where ￿(q￿;n) repre-
sents the ﬁrst stage equilibrium proﬁt per ﬁrm. The social welfare is de-
noted by W = W (q￿;n), with W (q￿;n) such that:
(4) W (q￿;n) = R(q￿)
n Z
0
P (s)ds ￿ n[C (q￿) + F];
We can now evaluate the welfare effect of competition. Differentiating con-





@n . The welfare effect
is twofold. The direct effect is given by @W
@n = R(q￿)P(n) ￿ [C(q￿) + F].
As long as proﬁts remain non negative, @W
@n has a non negative value. This




@n . According to Proposition 1, the average quality on the
market decreases with respect to the number of ﬁrms,
@q￿
@n < 0. The welfare
effect of an increase in quality, @W
@q , is given by @W




n￿C0 (q￿). P (n￿) <
n￿ R
0
P (s)ds, thus this term has a positive value. There-
fore, the indirect welfare effect @W
@q
@q￿
@n has a negative value.
When food operators share a collective reputation, the welfare effect of
competition is ambiguous. An increase in the number of ﬁrms reduces each
ﬁrm’s market power and prices, thereby improving social welfare. Yet at
the same time, it lowers the average quality on the market, reducing social
welfare.
Proposition 2 Free entry is not socially optimal.
6Proof. We evaluate the marginal variation of welfare at the free entry







P (s)ds ￿ n￿C0 (q￿)
#
@q￿
@n : According to
Proposition 1 and that @W
@q = R0 (q￿)
n￿ R
0
P (s)ds ￿ n￿C0 (q￿) > 0, this expres-
sion has a strict negative value.
Numerical example: We consider the following speciﬁcation of the model.
The collective reputation is characterized by a logit function of the average
quality, qa: R(qa) =
qa
1+qa. The inverse demand function is assumed to be
linear, P (n) = ￿ ￿ n where ￿ > 0. The cost function to provide quality is
C (qi) = 1
2 (1 + qi)
2. The individual ex ante proﬁt function can be written































2 . Therefore, the social welfare is:































Figure 1. The Welfare Effects of Competition
When n￿ ﬁrms compete in the market, the positive welfare effect of com-
petition disappears. Therefore, the regulator needs to intervene in order to
avoid free-riding incentives and to prevent the entire industry from failing
to perform. This result contributes to the critical debate in the industrial
organization literature concerning the justiﬁcation of anti-competitive reg-
ulation. For instance, Mankiw and Whinston (1986) have shown that in
7homogeneous product markets, free entry can lead to a socially excessive
number of ﬁrms. They model a situation in which the output per ﬁrm falls
as the number of ﬁrms in the industry increases. In our model, we assume
that the output per ﬁrm is constant, however, the free-riding incentives on
collective reputation lead us to the same conclusion. A minimum quality
standard is the most commonly used regulatory tool in the food industry,
guaranteeing product quality/safety (Marette 2007). In the next section,
we examine the competition effects when a minimum quality standard is
introduced by the regulator.
Minimum Quality Standard
While maintaining our focus on the entry issue, we examine the situation
where the regulator imposes a Minimum Quality Standard.
Magnitude of the MQS
First, we characterize a particular quality choice, qc, which is the cooper-
ative equilibrium quality in the second stage. This level is the solution
of Max
q￿0
R(q)P (n) ￿ C (q), leading to the following ﬁrst order condition
R0 (qc)P (n) ￿ C0 (qc) = 0. Note that qc represents the optimal quality level
for the industry.
Second, we assume that the regulator imposes a MQS denoted by qs. qs is
exogenous and common knowledge. Firms make their entry and quality
decisions according to the magnitude of qs. Food operators are ordered to
implement a quality level qi such that qi ￿ qs. Let q￿￿ = q￿ (n￿) denote the
non cooperative subgame perfect equilibrium quality level.
Proposition 3 If qs ￿ q￿￿, the MQS has no effect on competition, i.e. the number
of ﬁrms is n￿; There exists q0 ￿ qc such that for q￿￿ ￿ qs ￿ q0, the number of
ﬁrms is higher than n￿ and for qs ￿ q0, the number of ﬁrms is lower than n￿. The
number of ﬁrms is maximal for qs = qc.
Proof. When the MQS is lower than the equilibrium non cooperative
quality level qs ￿ q￿￿, ﬁrms implement the (non cooperative) subgame
perfect equilibrium quality level q￿￿ and the number of ﬁrms in the mar-
ket remains n￿. When the MQS is higher than the (non cooperative) sub-
game perfect equilibrium quality level qs ￿ q￿￿, let nm denote the num-
ber of ﬁrms who enter the market. It is characterized by ￿(qs;nm) =
8R(qs)P (nm) ￿ C (qs) ￿ F = 0. Differentiating the latter condition with
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. The number of ﬁrms nm increases when q￿￿ ￿
qs ￿ qc and decreases when the MQS level is higher than the cooperative







￿(qs;1). From Assumption 2










nm ￿ 1: Accordingly, there exists q0 which satisﬁes the
conditions set in the proposition (see Figure 2).
If the MQS is sufﬁciently low, it does not inﬂuence either competition or
the ﬁrm’s quality choice. Increasing the level of the MQS raises the level of
the collective reputation by increasing ﬁrms’ quality level. The MQS does
not alter competition and induces ﬁrms to enter the market as long as the
cost of providing the MQS level is sufﬁciently low. At the cooperative equi-
librium quality level (qc), the collective reputation and the total proﬁt are
maximal. When the MQS is imposed at such a level, a maximum number
of ﬁrms enter the market.
For MQS levels higher than the cooperative level, the marginal cost of pro-
viding quality overcomes the marginal beneﬁt, leading to a drop in proﬁts.
Consequently, the MQS alters competition and less ﬁrms enter the market.
The number of ﬁrms remains higher than it would under free entry as long
as the MQS is low enough (up to q0). For higher MQS levels, the number of
ﬁrms becomes less than the number of ﬁrms at the free entry point. This is








9Figure 2. Number of Firms and MQS.
In the light of these statements, we turn now to analyze the welfare effect
after a MQS has been imposed.
Welfare effect of the MQS
The welfare function at the free entry point when there are n￿ ﬁrms in the
industry who have implemented the non cooperative quality level equal to







. At the free entry point, if the MQS is such






. Namely, R(q￿￿) ￿ R(qs). There-
fore, average quality is higher once a MQS has been introduced. The MQS
increases competition, there are more ﬁrms in the industry (n￿ ￿ ns) which
increases consumers’ surplus. Therefore,
n￿ R
0




nsP(ns). Relative to free entry, the introduction of a MQS improves wel-
fare as long as the level of the MQS leads to a greater number of active
ﬁrms. This result adds another dimension to previous conclusions on min-
imumqualitystandardsandcollectivereputation. WinfreeandMcCluskey
(2005) argue that when ﬁrms share a collective reputation, the introduction
of MQS limits incentives to free-ride. The minimum quality standard is
then Pareto improving for ﬁrms but they do not take into account a com-
petition effect.
Conclusion
The issue of collective reputation is not exclusive to ﬁrms who sell regional
or specialty products. Collective reputation may be at stake when food op-
erators sell food items that consumers consider as generic. For instance, an
entire industry may suffer decreased demand following a food safety out-
break. In order to prevent quality and safety failures, food operators en-
deavour to sustain an accurate level of quality in the market. However, the
more ﬁrms there are in the industry, the greater the incentive to free-ride on
the quality of others. We show that free-entry leads to a sub-optimal num-
ber of ﬁrms in the market. Therefore, the regulator needs to intervene in
order to avoid the incentive to free-ride and to prevent the entire industry
10from failing to perform. A solution could be to restrict the number of ﬁrms
in the market. However, such regulation would lead to an increase in price.
Moreover, it would limit the incentive to free ride but it won’t eliminate it.
This statement supports the introduction of a minimum quality standard
in the industry. Indeed, a minimum quality standard allows to avoid both
negative welfare effects of the latter policy.
By focusing on entry, this article provides new results for research on col-
lective reputation and minimum quality standards. We show that the in-
troduction of a minimum quality standard can induce ﬁrms to enter the
market and consequently it does not always alter competition, sustaining
both the average quality in the industry and the level of welfare. To con-
clude, minimum quality standards should not be systematically considered
by the regulator as an anti-competitive regulation.
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